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Abstract— Finding low-weight multiples of a binary
polynomial is a difficult problem arising in the context
of stream ciphers cryptanalysis. The best algorithms to
solve this problem are based on a time memory trade-
off. Staying in this category, we will present a new
approach using discrete logarithm rather than a direct
representation of the involved polynomials. This provides
an alternative to the previously known algorithms which
improves in some case the computational complexity. 1
I. INTRODUCTION
Correlation and fast correlation attacks are probably
the most important classes of attacks against stream
ciphers based on linear feedback shift registers (LFSRs).
They were originally proposed by Siegenthaler [13] and
improved by Meier and Staffelbach [10]. Since then,
many different versions have been proposed [1], [8], [7],
[9], either very general or adapted to specific designs.
The basic idea is to consider that the output of the
stream cipher is a noisy version of a sequence generated
by an LFSR with the same initial state. The attack
can be seen as an error-correction problem: recover the
sequence, and therefore the initial state of the LFSR.
To do this most of the attacks take advantage of parity
check equations existing in the sequence we are trying to
recover. Those parity check equations are in fact given by
the multiples of the feedback polynomial, and to keep
the bias as low as possible, low-weight multiples are
necessary. As a precomputation step, we thus have to
find those parity check equations before using them in
the active part of the attack.
Depending on our objectives (finding one or many
such multiples) and on the parameters (degree of the
feedback polynomial and of the multiples, expected
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weight), there exists different algorithms to find low-
weight multiples (see [2], [5]). We will complete them by
another approach based on the use of discrete logarithm
over finite fields. This will lead to a new algorithm
for the computation of polynomials multiples that has
better performance for some problems. Remark that the
complexity of the best method is often still very high for
parameters used in real cryptosystem. Notice also that in
[11] discrete logarithms were already used to compute
multiples of weight 3 and 4. We have generalized this
idea and improved the complexity analysis.
The paper is organized as follows. Section II in-
troduces some notations. The usual approach used to
compute low-weight multiples is presented in Section
III. In Section IV, we detail our main algorithm and
compare its complexity with the algorithm of [2]. Then,
we will see in Section V how the complexity is modified
when we only want to find a few multiples and not all.
Finally, we will discuss in Section VI some important
practical points and give some experimental results in
Section VII.
II. PRELIMINARY
A. Notations
The problem we will be dealing with is the following.
Problem 1 (Low-weight polynomial multiple):
Input: A binary primitive polynomial P ∈ F2[X] of
degree n, and two integers w and D.
Output: All the multiples of P of weight at most w
and degree at most D.
The number of expected such multiples of P is
heuristically approximated by Dw−1(w−1)!2n , considering that
for D large enough, the values of the polynomials of
weight w and degree at most D are uniformly distributed.
Most of the time, the degree D and the weight are chosen
high enough for many solutions to exist as we need many
parity check equations to mount an attack.
It’s also worth noticing that we almost never need
all the multiples. In fact, to mount a successful attack,
one only have to find a fixed number of parity check
equations. It is thus sufficient to find many — but not
all — multiples, which might be much easier, especially
if the constraint on the degree and the weight are
high enough. We therefore introduce a slightly different
problem.
Problem 2:
Input: A binary primitive polynomial P ∈ F2[X] of
degree n, and three integers w, D and B.
Output: B multiples of P of weight at most w and
degree at most D, or as much as possible if there are
not B such multiples.
III. THE CLASSICAL APPROACH
A. The algorithm
The main idea is to use a time-memory trade-off
(TMTO). Set w = q1 + q2 + 1 with q1 ≤ q2.
Algorithm 1 (TMTO):
• For all the q1-tuples Γ = (γ1, . . . , γq1) with 0 <
γ1 < · · · < γq1 ≤ D, compute and store the pairs
〈Xγ1 + · · ·+Xγq1 mod P ; Γ〉.
• For all q2-tuples ∆ = (δ1, . . . , δq2) with 0 < δ1 <
· · · < δq2 ≤ D, compute Xδ1 + · · ·+Xδq2 mod P .
Look in the table for an element XORing to 1 (this
can be efficiently done by using an hash table).
If it exists, this gives
1 +
∑
γ∈Γ
Xγ +
∑
δ∈∆
Xδ = 0 mod P.
B. Complexity
The usual time-memory trade-off is q1 =
⌊
w−1
2
⌋
and
q2 =
⌈
w−1
2
⌉
, in order to balance the complexity of the
two phases of the algorithm. The most time consuming
part depends on the parity of w, as we do not have to
compute anything to find the collisions if q1 = q2.
The memory complexity is then O (Dq1) (for the first
phase) while the time complexity is O (Dq2). Remark
that in [2] the memory usage of the algorithm has been
improved in order to use only O
(
D⌈
w−1
4
⌉
)
bits.
IV. USING DISCRETE LOGARITHM
A. The algorithm
In this section, we will consider the field F2n defined
as F2[x]/ 〈P 〉. The discrete logarithm (with base element
x) in this field will be denoted by Log.
Set w = q1 + q2 + 2 with q1 ≤ q2. Take two tuples
Γ = (γ1, . . . , γq1) with 0 < γ1 < · · · < γq1 ≤ D
and
∆ = (δ1, . . . , δq2) with 0 < δ1 < · · · < δq2 ≤ D.
Denoting by LΓ and L∆ the logarithms of 1 +∑
γ∈Γ x
γ and 1 +
∑
δ∈∆ x
δ respectively, the following
equalities hold in F2[x]/ 〈P 〉:
1 +
∑
γ∈Γ
xγ = xLΓ−L∆
(
1 +
∑
δ∈∆
xδ
)
and
xL∆−LΓ

1 +∑
γ∈Γ
xγ

 = 1 +∑
δ∈∆
xδ.
Now let e ∈ ] − 2n−1, 2n−1] such that e is equal to
LΓ − L∆ modulo 2n − 1. If e > 0, then the polynomial
1 +∑
γ∈Γ
xγ

+ xe
(
1 +
∑
δ∈∆
xδ
)
(1)
is a multiple of P with degree max(γq1 , δq2+e). If e < 0,
then the polynomial
x−e

1 +∑
γ∈Γ
xγ

+
(
1 +
∑
δ∈∆
xδ
)
(2)
is a multiple of P with degree max(γq1 − e, δq2). So, if
one of the two following conditions is satisfied
e > 0 and δq2 + e ≤ D
e < 0 and γq1 − e ≤ D
we get a multiple of P with degree at most D and weight
at most w. We can rewrite both conditions in a single
inequality
γq1 −D ≤ e ≤ D − δq2 . (3)
The algorithm is then straightforward.
Algorithm 2 (LogTMTO):
• For all the q1-tuples Γ = (γ1, . . . , γq1) with 0 <
γ1 < · · · < γq1 ≤ D, compute
LΓ = Log (1 + x
γ1 + · · ·+ xγq1 )
and store the pairs 〈LΓ; Γ〉 .
• For all q2-tuples ∆ = (δ1, . . . , δq2) with 0 < δ1 <
· · · < δq2 ≤ D compute the logarithm
L∆ = Log
(
1 + xδ1 + · · ·+ xδq2
)
and look in the table for all the elements with a
logarithm LΓ satisfying (3). For each of them we
obtain a multiple of P given by (1) or (2) depending
on the sign of e.
Of course, since we can decompose all polynomials of
weight w in
(w−1
q1
)
way, we obtain each multiple many
times.
B. Complexity
In order to perform the second phase, one could
sort the table with increasing logarithms, but using an
appropriate data structure like an hash table indexed by
the most significants bits of the logarithm is a lot more
efficient. As long as D < 2n/2, the search cost is O (1).
Once again, we choose the parameters of the time-
memory trade-off in order to balance the complexity of
the two phases, taking q1 =
⌊
w−2
2
⌋
and q2 =
⌈
w−2
2
⌉
.
As for the classical algorithm, the most time consum-
ing part depends on the parity of w as we do not have to
compute any logarithm in the second phase if q1 = q2.
The memory usage is then O (Dq1), while the time
complexity is O (Dq2) logarithm computations. We will
see in Section VI-B that the logarithm can be computed
quite efficiently. Actually for many practical values of n
we can even compute it in O (1). Hence we neglect it
in Table I.
TABLE I
COMPARISON BETWEEN TMTO AND LOGTMTO
w = 2p w = 2p+ 1
Algorithm Time Memory Time Memory
TMTO Dp D⌈p/2⌉ Dp D⌈p/2⌉
LogTMTO Dp−1 Dp−1 Dp Dp−1
As we can see in Table I, if w is even we can improve
the time complexity compared to the classical approach.
Heuristically, the improvement by a factor D can be
explained by the fact that we look for values in an
interval of size roughly D instead of exact collisions.
Regarding the memory however, as explained in [2]
the computation behind the classical algorithm can be
done using only O (D⌈p/2⌉) bits. So the discrete log-
arithms approach is always worse for odd w and will
only be of practical interest when we are looking for all
the multiples of weight 4 and maybe 6. After that, the
memory usage just become too important.
However, we will see in the next section that when we
are only looking for a small fraction of all the multiples
of degree up to D, the discrete logarithms method can
be quite efficient.
V. FIND MANY BUT NOT ALL
We deal in this section with the problem of finding
a small proportion of all the multiples of weight w
and degree at most D (Problem 2). If the number B
of polynomials we want is small enough, depending
on the parameters, we can do better than the previous
algorithms.
A very basic approach is to try random polynomials of
weight w until we actually find a multiple. In expectation
we will then find a multiple every 2n polynomials tried.
We can also do the same using discrete logarithms. By
computing logarithms for polynomials A of weight w−1
and degree less than D, we can obtain easily low-weight
multiples of type A+xLog(A) if the logarithm is at most
D. The expectation here is to find a multiple every 2n/D
iterations and we have won a factor D.
However, the best methods to solve this problem
are once again TMTO. The algorithms are just simple
variations of the previous ones when we put the elements
in the hash table one by one and stop when we have
found enough multiples.
Applying the birthday paradox, we can thus find with
the basic algorithm a multiple with a time and memory
complexity of O (√2n) in average. Using discrete loga-
rithms, we will find a multiple as soon as two logarithms
have a distance by approximately D. The complexity is
then in O
(√
2n
D
)
both in time and memory. Remark
that in this case one cannot use the improvement of [2]
to gain memory. There is also another approach based
on Wagner’s generalized birthday paradox (see [14], [5])
that can be usefull when w is large. Its complexity is in
O (2a2n/(a+1)) for a a such that ( D(w−1)/2a) ≥ 2n/(a+1).
As a conclusion to this section, when computing
logarithms in F⋆
2n
is easy, we can gain a factor
√
D
in time and memory to find a multiple. Notice also
that in practice when we need many multiples, we can
design an algorithm between the one that compute all
the multiples and the one presented here in order to get
the best performance. We will see an illustration of this
in Section VII.
VI. PRACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS
A. Bounds on the degree
First of all, it is worth noticing that it is not necessary
to compute all the multiples up to the degree D to take
all q2-tuples up to the degree D.
As a polynomial of weight w has many representations
as a sum of a polynomial of weight q1 + 1 and q2 + 1
respectively, we can choose the one with the smallest
q2-tuple.
Proposition 1: Let M = 1 +
∑
i∈I X
i be a multiple
of P of weight w = q1 + q2 + 2 and degree at most D.
Then there exists an integer 1 ≤ e ≤ D and two
polynomials A and B of respective weight q1 and q2
and of degree respectively at most D and at most Dq2w−1
such that M = (1 +A) +Xe (1 +B) or Xe (1 +A) +
(1 +B) .
With the usual trade-off, we can restrict ourselves to
the degree D/2, dividing the cost of the second phase
approximately by a factor 2w/2.
B. How to compute logarithms
In practice, it is important to compute efficiently
discrete logarithms in F⋆
2n
and hopefully there exists
well studied algorithms to do that. It is important to
take into account that we are going to compute many
logarithms and not only one. All the efficient algorithms
for computing logarithms (Baby-step Giant-step, Pohlig-
Hellman algorithm [12] and Coppersmith algorithm [3],
[4]) can profit from a bigger precomputation step that
can be done once and for all. For instance, if 2n − 1
is smooth enough, one can tabulate the logarithms in
all the subgroups of F⋆
2n
to make the Pohlig-Hellman
algorithm very efficient. In this case, a subsequent dis-
crete logarithm computation can be done in O (1). This
approach can be used for all the n up to 78 except
{37, 41, 49, 59, 61, 62, 65, 67, 69, 71, 74, 77}. In addition
we have listed in Table II some larger n for which it is
applicable and the corresponding memory requirement.
Notice that a full tabulation corresponds to a Giant-step
of 1 and that by increasing a little this Giant-step, we
can efficiently deal with more values of n .
TABLE II
MEMORY USAGE FOR A FULLY TABULATED POHLIG-HELLMAN
ALGORITHM AND SOME SMOOTH 2n − 1
n 53 96 110 156 210
memory 439MB 510MB 1.7GB 940MB 201MB
This leads to a very easy and efficient implementation
as we will see in Section VII. Moreover, for the most
useful cases (that is w ∈ {3, 4, 5}) we have to compute
logarithms of the form Log
(
1 + xi
)
. This logarithm is
know as the Zech’s logarithm of i, and we can exploit
some properties of Zech’s logarithm (see [6]) to speed
up the computation. Actually, by computing one Zech
logarithm we get 6n other logarithms for free. Of course
not all of them are useful for us, but the computation time
can be divided by a factor of at least 2.
VII. EXPERIMENTAL RESULT
We have implemented our algorithm in C to test its
efficiency. The computer used for our experiments is a
3.6GHz Pentium4 with 2MB of cache and 2GB of RAM.
A. Problem 1
We give in Table III the timings to find all the
multiples of weight w up to degree D of the polynomial
P = x53+x47+x45+x44+x42+x40+x39+x38+x36+
x33+x32+x31+x30+x28+x27+x26+x25+x21+x20+
x17+x16+x15+x13+x11+x10+x7+x6+x3+x2+x1+1.
As explained in the previous section, we used a fully
tabulated Pohlig-Hellman.
TABLE III
PROBLEM 1: FIND ALL THE MULTIPLES UP TO DEGREE D
n 53
w 4 5
log
2
(D) 20 22 28 13 14 16
time 47′′ 2′02′′ 1h52′ 4′11′′ 14′40′′ 3h33′
We can see that the algorithm is, as expected, very
efficient for weight 4 as its complexity is linear in the
degree D, both for time and memory (to be compared
to a quadratic complexity for the classical approach).
We were also able to compute all the multiples of
weight 5 and degree up to 216 of a polynomial of degree
53 within a few hours. But for the degree 5 the algorithm
of [2] is more efficient.
B. Problem 2
With the same polynomial of degree n = 53, we
also looked for multiples with an higher weight w = 7,
and degree at most D = 215. In order to do that, we
precomputed all the trinomials (1 + xγ1 + xγ2) up to
the degree K, which corresponds to q1 = 2, instead
of 3 for the optimal trade-off. We then computed many
discrete logarithm of random polynomials (1+xδ1+xδ2+
xδ3 + xδ4) in order to find multiples of weight 7. The
results are given in Figure 1 where we see that a bigger
precomputation can greatly improve the performance.
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Fig. 1. Evolution of the number of multiples of weight 7 and degree
lower than 215 found with precomputed logarithms up to degree K
VIII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we devised an algorithm to find low-
weight multiples of a given binary polynomial that
appears to be efficient for two cases that actually occur
in practice.
The first case is when we are looking for all the
multiples of weight 4 and degree at most D of a given
polynomial of degree n. The complexity is then in
O (D) discrete logarithms computation in F⋆
2n
where
the other approach run in O (D2). So the best algorithm
will depends on the complexity of a discrete logarithm
computation in F⋆
2n
which can be smaller than D in
many practical situations. Notice that our algorithm may
also give better performance for multiples of weight 6.
The other case where discrete logarithms can be useful
is when we are only looking for a small fraction of all
the possible multiples. The complexity to find one of
them is then O
(√
2n
D
)
logarithm computations.
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